Denver Law Review
Volume 45

Issue 5

Article 11

January 1968

War - Time of War - Effect of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on the
Determination of a Time of War in Military and Civilian Courts United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386
(1968); Freed v. Baldi, 443 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1968)
Robert Edd Lee

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Robert Edd Lee, War - Time of War - Effect of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on the Determination of a Time
of War in Military and Civilian Courts - United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386
(1968); Freed v. Baldi, 443 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1968), 45 Denv. L.J. 797 (1968).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

COMMENT

1968

the original constitutional issue put to the court, it is difficult to
make any definite statement about the practical effect of the
Burnell decision on Colorado law or subsequent decisions in other
jurisdictions. Perhaps a lower Colorado court or an appellate court
in another jurisdiction could legitimately avoid the apparent holding
of Burnell on the basis of reasoning such as that outlined above.
Even the dictum which the court expressed rests upon a logically
unsound basis: "Additionally, we believe the probate court erred in
classifying the criminally insane with those found guilty of crimes
and incarcerated in the state penitentiary. This classification cannot
be found in any legislative enactment. ' 30 The court is interpreting
the probate court's classification of criminally insane with criminally
convicted as inconsistent with the legislative classification. However,
the probate court made no such ruling, but, to the contrary, found
that the legislative classification was invalid as violative of the equal
protection clause.
The important issues inherent in the case being left thus unresolved by the Burnell decision, it is to be hoped that a subsequent
consideration of these issues will provide the law in this area with
a legally and logically sound precedent which recognizes the emerging issues of social policy concerning the penology of criminally
insane persons.
Darryl Kaneko
Karen Metzger
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United States v. Anderson, 17
U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968); Freed v. Baldi, 443 P.2d
716 (Colo. 1968).
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COURTS. -

In Anderson, the accused absented himself without authority
from his unit in Fort Polk, Louisiana, on November 3, 1964. On
February 10, 1967, he surrendered to civilian authorities and was
see note 4 supra and accompanying text. However, it is apparent that no court dealing
with one or more of these distinctions has recognized all of the distinctions, even
when they may have been relevant. Thus, all of the cases above cited are distinguishable on their facts, and no principle or principles of law articulated by these courts
adequately synthesize the varying fact situations into a logical structure.
30 State v. Estate of Burnell, 439 P.2d 38, 40 (Colo. 1968).
1Joint Resolution to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in
Southeast Asia, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964). The resolution was subsequently criticized by members of the Senate as not accurately reflecting the intent
of the Congress. Hearings on S.R. 151 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations
on United States Commitments to Foreign Powers, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 118, 132
(1967).
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returned to military control. He was charged with desertion' and
was convicted by a general court-martial for that offense. On review, the conviction for desertion was reversed, but a finding of
guilty for the lesser offense of unauthorized absences was affirmed.
The Board of Review considered the effect of the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution in establishing a "time of war" for purposes of tolling
the two-year statute of limitations 4 and determined that the offense
could be tried and punished at any time without limitation. On
appeal to the United States Court of Military Appeals, held,
affirmed. "When a state of hostilities is expressly recognized by
both Congress and the President, it is incumbent upon the
judiciary to accept the consequences that attach to such recognition." 5 The court was divided on the significance of the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, passed by Congress on August 10, 1964, in
determining the beginning of "time of war" for military justice.
In Freed, a patrolman who had taken a civil service examination for promotion to sergeant in the Denver Police Department
was awarded a ten point veteran's preference provided by the
Colorado constitution for candidates who have served in the
armed forces of the United States in time of war and who have
been honorably discharged. 6 The constitution enumerated certain
wars for which this preference is to be given, including "the
period of any war in which the United States may hereafter engage." 7 Patrolman Freed served in the armed forces from June
13, 1952, until June 12, 1956. Without the veteran's preference
Freed would have placed 56th on the eligibility list; with the
points he was ranked third. Patrolmen displaced by Freed's repositioning because of the veteran's preference brought actions
alleging that Freed was awarded the preference points illegally.
The trial court did not rule on the effect of the Korean conflict,
but found that World War II ended for purposes of the constitution on April 28, 1952, almost two months before Freed entered
the service. Thus, the trial court found that Freed was wrongfully awarded ten veteran's preference points. On appeal to the
2

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 885 '(1964) [hereinafter cited as

U.C.M.J.].

§ 886 (1964).
U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1964) provides, inter alia, that "[a] person charged
with desertion or absence without leave in time of war . . . may be tried and punished at any time without limitation." In times of peace, the statute of limitations
period for desertion is 3 years and for unauthorized absence, 2 years. Id. §§

3U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C.
4

843 (b), (c).
5 United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 590, 38 C.M.R. 386, 388 (1968).
6 COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 14.

7Id.
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Supreme Court of Colorado, held, affirmed in part.8 Although
the court recognized the presence of United States forces in Korea
during the period between June 27, 1950, and January 31, 1955,
it determined "that the reference 'in times of war' and 'the period
of any war in which the United States may hereafter engage'
refers to war officially declared by Congress.'' Service in Korea,
therefore, was not in "time of war" for purposes of the Colorado
veteran's preference.
The two subject cases of this Comment demonstrate the wide
divergence among the courts in determining when a "time of
war" exists. From the strictest interpretation requiring an official
declaration of war to the most pragmatic determination requiring
only a recognition by Congress and the President that hostilities
exist, the responses of the courts are being challenged by a fundamental change in the style of military conflict - the demise of
formally declared wars in the traditional sense. As cases arise
involving the fighting in Vietnam, the courts will have to consider the effect of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which may be
sufficiently analogous to a declaration of war so as to nullify
the previously convenient device of finding all military conflicts
not formalized by Congress to be something less than wars.
I. MILITARY JURISDICTIONS
In the military courts, a formal declaration of war has never
been a sine qua non to finding a "time of war" for purposes of
military justice. Since it has become the fashion to commence wars
with sudden attacks mounted without warning, the military court
usually bases its determination that a "time of war" exists on
the occurrence of hostilities outside of the country, involving the
use of military forces of the United States.1 ° This allows ample
opportunity for offenses to occur between the beginning of hostilities and the subsequent Constitutional formality of a declaration
of war by Congress, if in fact any such formal action is ever taken.
Therefore, the military courts rely heavily on nonformal criteria
in identifying the beginning and ending of hostilities for purposes
of military justice." Equally important, the consideration given
8

Freed v. Baldi, 443 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1968), appeal dismissed, 89 S.Ct. 553 (1969).
The trial court was affirmed in its decision that the veteran's preference points were
wrongfully awarded, but the case was remanded so that the trial court could order
that the promotion to sergeant be rescinded as well.
9
Id. at 719.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Shell, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 23 C.M.R. 110 (1957); United
States v. Ayres, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 15 C.M.R. 220 (1954) ; United States v. Bancroft,
3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953) ; United States v. Gann, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 12,
11 C.M.R. 12 (1953); United States v. Anderson, C.M. 347025, 1 C.M.R. 345
(1951).
i1See text accompanying note 18 infra.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 45

the acts of the political departments goes solely to the occurrence
of such acts rather than to their validity or constitutionality.
The determination of "time of war" in military law' 2 affects
the jurisdiction of courts-martial,' 3 the availability of defenses,' 4
the tolling of the statute of limitations,'" and the severity of
punishment' 6 for certain offenses prohibited by the Uniform Code
of Military Justice. Because of the abrupt changes in the scope and
severity of military prosecutions for certain offenses during wartime, the military court is usually the first to have to consider the
existence of a "time of war."
In United States v. Bancroft,1" the leading case identifying
the criteria military courts will look to in determining the beginning
and ending of a "time of war," the court relied upon
the very nature of the present conflict; the manner in which it is
carried on; the movement to, and the presence of large numbers
of American men and women on, the battlefields of Korea; the
casualties involved; the sacrifices required; the drafting of recruits
to maintain the large number of persons in the military services;
the national emergency legislation enacted and being enacted; the
executive orders promulgated; and the tremendous sums being
expended ....
18

The court expressly rejected the need to consider a formal declaration of war as a condition precedent to a "time of war," and
declared that "for our purposes, it matters not whether the authorization for the military activities in Korea springs from Congressional declarations, United Nations agreements or orders by the
Chief Executive.'"" In short, the court considers its role to consist

solely of determining whether the conditions involved constitute
12 For an excellent article considering the existence of a "time of war" in Vietnam for

purposes of military justice, but written before the United States Court of Military
Appeals considered the question, see Stevens, Time of War and Vietnam, 8 Am FORCE
J.A.G.L. REv., May-June 1966, at 23.
3
' U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1964). In establishing persons subject to the
U.C.M.J., this article includes "in time of war ... persons accompanying or serving
with the armies of the United States in the field."
14U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 843 (1964).
15U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1964). For a discussion of the effect of "time of
war" on the tolling of the statute of limitations see the comment on Anderson in 82
HARv. L. REv. 483 (1968).
6
1 U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 885(c) (1964) provides that "any person found guilty of
desertion . . . shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death
or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct," and § 913, prohibiting
misbehavior of a sentinel, provides that the offense shall be punished "if the
offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a courtmartial may direct .... " Section 856 provides that the maximum punishment shall
be set by the President. As yet, the President has not raised the maximum limitation
for the capital offenses to death for purposes of military justice during present
hostilities in Vietnam. See also 82 HARv. L. REv. 483 (1968).
1"3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953).
18ld. at 5.
19 Id.
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a "time of war" within the meaning of the terms as used in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.
In Anderson, the issue of "time of war" revolved about the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Speaking for the court, Chief Judge
Quinn found that "[t]he language of the resolution clearly indicates that Congress also recognized and declared, as a legislative
decision, that the Gulf of Tonkin attack precipitated a state of
armed conflict between the United States and North Vietnam."2 °
Furthermore, "When a state of hostilities is expressly recognized
by both Congress and the President, it is incumbent upon the
judiciary to accept the consequences that attach to such recognition. ' 21 Of the two judges concurring in the result, one did not
"agree that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution amounts to or constitutes a declaration of war,' '22 and the other found that "it
is unnecessary to consider the resolution or to characterize it
either as a declaration of war . . . or as evidence of the existence
of conflict ....
23

The strongest characterization of the Resolution is still a long
way from those words of art which call into effect all of the
international implications of a declaration of war. The question
still remains- what degree of congressional recognition of a war
is required to "make it incumbent upon the judiciary to accept
the consequences"24 and to determine that a "time of war" exists?
The answer depends on the case before the court. In Anderson,
the court was concerned with how much military involvement was
required to bring into effect the additional sanctions and provisions the Congress included in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice for "time of war.' '25 Surely the Congress adequately recognized the state of hostilities when it appropriated funds,2 6 or
provided the participants in the fighting with additional veteran's
benefits, 27

or passed any of the many other acts specifically

recognizing the fighting in Vietnam. 28 And there can be no doubt
that the President recognized the hostilities when he proclaimed a day
of observance and prayer for the defense of South Vietnam, 29 pro20 17

U.S.C.M.A. at 590, 38 C.M.R. at 388 (emphasis added).

21

Id.
22
Id. at 593, 38 C.M.R. at 391 (Kilday, J.).
23id. at
24 Id. at

594, 38 C.M.R. at 392 (Ferguson, J.).
590, 38 C.M.R. at 388.

25See notes 13-16 supra.
26 Pub. L. No. 89-374, 80 Stat. 79 (1966).
27
Pub. L. No. 90-77, 81 Stat. 178 (1967).
28 For court decisions finding congressional recognition of hostilities see Bas v. Tingy,
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800); Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136 F. 445 (C.C. Kan.
1905) ; United States v. Bancroft, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953).
2 Presidential Proclamation No. 3686, 3 C.F.R. 145 (1965).
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claimed the area a combat zone for pay and decoration purposes, 30
and raised the maximum sentence for the misbehavior of a sentinel
when in an area where forces are eligible for combat pay."1
In short, there were ample facts available to allow a military
court to determine the existence of a "time of war" even without
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The significance of Anderson is
that the court did rely upon the Resolution to the extent that the
judge writing the opinion of the court considered it equivalent to
a declaration of war. Because of this characterization of the
Resolution, civilian courts which formerly required an actual declaration of war for particular purposes may have to give more
credence to the argument that the Resolution is a sufficient condition precedent to a formally declared war.
II. CIVILIAN JURISDICTIONS

In the civilian courts there are two competing lines of authority
on the issue whether a "time of war" exists under the circumstances
of a particular case." The more conservative approach requires
that a formal declaration of war precede any recognition of a
"time of war" for judicial purposes.3 3 The empirical approach the one also adopted by the military courts - requires only that
the circumstances be recognizable as war-like activity, whether
34
declared or otherwise.
The courts requiring a formal declaration as a condition
precedent to a "time of war" do so primarily to favor the insured
in the construction of an ambiguous phrase in insurance liability
litigation. The courts requiring a mere existence of such conditions
as would constitute a "time of war" in the popular understanding
of the term do so primarily because they see no ambiguity in the
term as understood by both parties to the insurance contract.
30

Exec. Order No. 11,216, 3 C.F.R. 301 (1965); Exec. Order No. 11,231, 3 C.F.R. 325
(1965).
31 Exec. Order No. 11,317, 3 C.F.R. 170 (Supp. 1966).
32
See generally Annot., 168 A.L.R. 173 (1947); Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 996 (1954).
33
Ex parte Givins, 262 F. 702 (N.D. Ga. 1920) ; Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Masch, 134
Colo. 70, 299 P.2d 117 (1956) ; Belay v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa.
231, 95 A.2d 202 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1954) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Davis, 79 Ga. App. 336, 53 S.E.2d 571 (1949) ; Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Beneficial
Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944) ; West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co.,
202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.2d 475 (1943).
34
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 811 (1946) ; Gagliormella v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 246
(D.C. Mass. 1954) ; Carius v. New York Life Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. Ill.
1954) ; Stinsen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; Thomas
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 388 Pa. 499, 131 A.2d 600 (1957); Christensen v.
Sterling Ins. Co., 46 Wash. 2d 13, 284 P.2d 287 (1955); Gudewicz v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 331 Mass. 752, 133 N.E.2d 900 (1954); Langlas v. Iowa
Life Ins. Co., 245 Iowa 713, 63 N.W.2d 885 (1954) ; Western Reserve Life Ins. Co.
v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 557, 261 S.W.2d 554 (1953).
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In both approaches, the determination of a "time of war" is
basically a factual one, based on what the phrase was intended to
mean in a contract, a statute, or a constitutional amendment. One
approach requires the fact of a declaration of war, 5 and the other
requires only certain facts showing an existing hostile military
confrontation. 6 In neither approach is the validity or legality of
the political departments' actions concerning the hostilities ever
before the courts. There is doubt that any such question could be
considered by the courts without raising grave constitutional problems of jurisdiction. 7
The Freed decision was based upon the conservative approach.
The court saw the case as resting primarily on the interpretation
of the phrase "in times of war" in the Colorado constitution.3
Acknowledging that World War II was officially ended prior
to the beginning of Freed's service, the court directed its attention
to the following question: "Is a person who has served in the
armed forces subsequent to April 28, 1952, during the time of
the 'Korean conflict,' entitled to veteran's preference points under
39
the Colorado Constitution as having served in time of war?"
Answering that question in the negative, the court based its
reasoning on a two-step process. First, it determined that the people
of Colorado had intended the phrase "in times of war" to mean
only war "officially declared by Congress. ' 40 In so doing, the
court was fulfilling its responsibilities as final arbiter in interpreting the state constitution, and although its interpretation is
questionable, criticism of its holding is not the purpose here.
Second, the court relied on the case of Pyramid Life Insurance Co.
38 Cases cited note 33 supra.
36 Cases cited note 34 supra.
37 Courts have generally refused to decide the politically potent questions arising from
commitment of United States forces to undeclared military actions. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) ; Stinsen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d
233 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166 F.2d 874 (10th Cir.
1948) ; Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F.2d 290 (D.C. Cir.), cort. denied,
329 U.S. 787 (1946) ; Weissman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 420
(S.D. Cal. 1953); In re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp. 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1952). See the
opinions of Justices Stewart and Douglas, dissenting from a denial of certiorari, in
Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, denying cert. to 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
38 443 P.2d at 717.
38 Id.
40
1d. at 719. The court admitted that of the four periods of hostility mentioned in t&e
amendment, only three - the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War
II- were wars formally declared by the United States. The fourth -the
Philippine
Insurrection -was
specifically included because otherwise it would not have been
encompassed within the general phrase "in times of war." The court followed with
the classic argument that had the people intended to include any period of hostility,
proper language to do so could have been used. The answer, of course, is equally
persuasive in that had the people intended to exclude any hostility not declared by
Congress, proper language to do that could have been used. Inclusion of the Philippine Insurrection seems to lend some weight to the argument that the people must
not have intended to restrict the provision to only declared wars. 443 P.2d at 719.
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v. Masch" in finding that the Korean conflict was never formalized by a declaration of war. The Freed court noted that "the
phrase 'in times of war' in the Constitution [Colorado] is identical
to that used in the insurance policy in Pyramid."4 2 On the strength
of this coincidence the court felt itself compelled to follow the
reasoning of Pyramid in deciding the Freed case; therefore, it could
only construe the language in the constitution as excluding the
Korean conflict since it had never been formally declared a war by
Congress.
The phrase "in times of war" was construed in Pyramid to
allow the beneficiary of an insurance contract to recover the full
value of the policy by finding that the Korean conflict was not a
"war" excluded by the policy language. 43 The dissenting opinion
in Freed points out the incongruity of considering a decision in
an insurance contract case as binding on the court when it is
interpreting the intent of the people of the state as expressed in
a constitutional amendment. Ambiguous language is customarily
construed against the company drawing the instrument in insurance
cases, but that certainly need not apply to the interpretation of
constitutional language.4 4
However much critics may object to this technique used by
the Freed court, the fact remains that the Korean conflict was
never sanctioned by congressional recognition in a formal sense.
That, though, brings us to the heart of the present inquiry.
Following a precedent representative of the most conservative
approach to the "time of war" problem, the Colorado court established in Freed that veteran's preference points could only be
awarded to veterans of wars "officially declared" by Congress. That
decision effectively excluded those who served in the armed forces
during the Korean conflict. In broader perspective, however, it
merely opens a Pandora's Box, because veterans returning from
Vietnam are able to refer the court's attention to a resolution passed
by both houses of Congress which resolved that "the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed
attack against the forces of the United States .

.

. to take all neces-

sary steps, including the use of armed force .... ""
Admittedly, this is not the same wording used to declare war
in the five wars during our history formalized by congressional
41134 Colo. 70, 299 P.2d 117 (1956).
42
Freed v. Baldi, 443 P.2d 716, 719 (Colo. 1968).
43 Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Masch, 134 Colo. 70, 73, 229 P.2d 117 (1956).
44 Freed v. Baldi, 443 P.2d 716, 720-21 (Colo. 1968) (Kelly, J. dissenting).
45 Joint Resolution to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in
Southeast Asia, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
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action, but it cannot be said to vary much from the substance of
past resolutions.4 6 The opinion of the court in Anderson characterized the Resolution as "a legislative decision, that the Gulf of
Tonkin attack precipitated a state of armed conflict between the
United States and North Vietnam.1 4 7 The objection by some members of the military court to characterizing the Resolution as a
declaration of war must be tempered by the realization that this
court could have reached the decision in Anderson even without

resort to the Resolution. The court found it to be the intent of
Congress to provide for certain measures in administering military
justice whenever the circumstances required.
The circumstances confronting the court in Freed were similar

to those confronting the Anderson court.
resolution to interpret by the Freed court.
How will the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
preme Court's determination whether the

However, there was no
The issue, therefore, is:
affect the Colorado Sufighting in Vietnam is

what the constitution includes within the phrase "period of any war
46 War of 1812, 2 Stat. 755.
Be it enacted by . . . Congress assembled, That war . . . is . . . declared
to exist . . . and that the President . . . is hereby authorized to use the
whole land and naval force . . . to carry the same into effect ....

Mexican War of 1846, 9 Stat. 9.
Be it enacted by . . . Congress assembled, That for the purpose of enabling
the . . . United States to prosecute said war to a speedy ... termination, the
President . . . is . . . authorized to employ the militia, naval, and military

forces of the United States ....
Spanish-American War of 1898, 30 Stat. 364.
Be it enacted by . . . Congress assembled, First, That war . . . is . . . de-

clared to exist ...

between the United States of America and the Kingdom

of Spain . .. [and) the President . . . is directed . . . to use the entire land
and naval forces . . . to such extent as may be necessary ....

World War I against Germany, 40 Stat. 1 (1917).
Resolved by . . . Congress assembled, That the state of war between the
United States and the Imperial German Government ... is hereby formally
declared . . . [and]

the President is . . . authorized . . . to employ the

entire naval and military forces ....
World War II against Japan, 55 Stat. 795 (1941).
Resolved . . . the state of war . . . is hereby formally declared . . . [and]
the President is . . . authorized . . . to employ the entire naval and military
forces . ...

World War II against Germany, 55 Stat. 796 (1941) (same as Japan).
World War II against Italy, 55 Stat. 797 (1941) (same as Japan).
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) reads in substance:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approved and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take
all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the
United States and to prevent further aggression.
Sec. 2 [T]he United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President
determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to
assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
47 United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 590, 38 C.M.R. 386, 388 (1968).
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in which the United States may hereafter engage."' 48 The answer
can only be speculative, but the evasive tactics used in Freed may
not be so readily available to the court when the effect of the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution is raised in a case requiring determination
whether the Vietnamese war was "officially declared" by Congress.
If the court were to determine that the Vietnamese war came within
the intent of the people of Colorado when adopting the constitutional amendment, those same people may wonder how they intended to include the Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnamese
war and failed to intend the "war" in Korea. But that problem of
interpretation is reserved for the court.
III.

MILITARY JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS

The Uniform Code of Military Justice purports to give courtsmartial jurisdiction over civilians accompanying military forces in
"time of war, ' 49 and caselaw supports this conclusion." Prior to
Vietnam, military prosecutions of civilians under such circumstances
were repeatedly upheld. However, in 1957, the Supreme Court held
that it was unconstitutional to court-martial servicemen's civilian
dependents for capital offenses committed during peacetime in
foreign areas. 5 In a series of cases in 1960, the Court went further.
holding that in both capital and noncapital cases, it was unconstitutional to court-martial either civilian employees or dependents
52
during peacetime conditions.
Although these decisions apply only to times of peace, they naturally raise the question of their possible effect on civilian offenses
in the war zone now that the Court of Military Appeals 'has determined a "time of war" exists in Vietnam. It appears for the present
that civilians accompanying the military in Vietnam are subject to
the jurisdiction of military courts.5 3 If a prosecution occurs, it is
not unlikely that habeas corpus would be initiated to test whether
the jurisdiction of the court-martial was validly grounded. That
would squarely present the civilian courts with the issue of the
48 COLO. CoNsT. art. XII, § 14 '(emphasis added).
49

U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1964).
OSee Ex parte Gerlach, 247 F. 616 (D.C.N.Y. 1918); Ex parte Falls, 251 F. 415
(D.C.N.J. 1918); Ex parte Mikel, 253 F. 817 (D.C.S.C. 1918), revd sub nom.,
Hines v. Mikel, 259 F. 28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 645 (1919) ; Perlstein
v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. 1945), cert. granted, 327 U.S. 777, cert.
dismissed as moot, 328 U.S. 822 (1946); McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80
(D.C. Va. 1943).
51
Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956), rev'd on rehearing, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
52
Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) ; Grisham v. Hagan,
361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281
(1960).
53See generally Weiner, Courts Martial for Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces
in Vietnam, 54 A.B.A.J. 24 (1968).
6
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existence of a "time of war" in Vietnam. From the general thrust
of the past decisions, it appears that the civilian court would reach
the same conclusion as Anderson. If that occurs, it is likely that
the Supreme Court would sustain, as a valid exercise of the war
powers by Congress, the extension of military jurisdiction to civilians
accompanying the military in "time of war." From the inception
of the Union, most hostile military action has been undertaken in
undeclared wars.5 4 It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would
find the intent of Congress to be that a formal declaration of war
must precede the operation of the "time of war" provisions in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, even as it pertains to civilians
in a war zone.
CONCLUSION

A judicial determination that a "time of war" exists is of unusually limited currency. Such a determination means only that the
particular activity at issue is substantially what was intended when
the phrase "time of war" was used in the particular contract, legislation, or amendment before the court. At any given time, a
military situation may be a "time of war" for some purposes and
not for others. The determination of a "time of war" is no more
than an incidental step in reaching a decision on the main issue.
Whatever questions may be entertained in the abstract concerning
the war powers of Congress, the morality of a particular war, or
the legality of military force, the answers are not to be found in a
judicial determination whether or not a "time of war" exists.
The Freed court decided that the people of Colorado intended
to allow veteran's preference points only to those who served in
wars formally declared by Congress, even though the constitutional
language is susceptible to a construction much less limited in scope.
The Anderson court raises the possibility that the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution may be as close to a formal declaration of war as will
ever again be seen in a world tempered by 20 years of cold
war and hot wars with limited objectives. The conflict between
the judicial viewpoints raises a dilemma which will only be resolved
when courts confront the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on the way
to deciding whether a "time of war" ever existed in Vietnam.
Robert Edd Lee

54 See enumerated declarations of war note 46 supra. All other military actions have

therefore been undeclared conflicts.

